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Firing Costs and the Business Cycle: Policy Implications in 
Light of the Financial Crisis 
Alessio Brown, Christian Merkl, Wolfgang Lechthaler 
Abstract 
This article shows that different firing costs substantially affect individual countries' business 
cycle dynamics. This may lead to asymmetric reaction patterns in a monetary union of 
countries with heterogenous labor market institutions. As in a monetary union monetary 
policy cannot react to these business cycle differences, we recommend two things. First, 
labor market institutions should be similar across countries in a monetary union to prevent 
too large divergences. Second, as long as this is not the case, structural policies, such as 
hiring vouchers, can be used as second best instrument to prevent divergences. 
1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has produced substantial turmoil in countries all over the world, 
both in their financial sectors and in their real economies. To be able to cope with the crisis, it 
is very important to have a solid understanding of how various labor market institutions affect 
the macroeconomic reaction to various aggregate shocks. Experience gained during the 
crisis can, however, only provide some understanding in this regard, as the time spans 
involved are still relatively short.  
To contribute to this understanding, we therefore rely on recent theoretical and empirical 
research that analyzes the role of ﬁring costs in macroeconomic volatilities. Both theory and 
empirics show that output reacts less volatilely (i.e., in a more persistent manner) to aggre-
gate shocks in countries with higher ﬁring costs. Thus, all else being equal, it can be 
expected, on the one hand, that countries with higher ﬁring costs will experience a small 
immediate effect in response to aggregate productivity shocks. However, persistence due to 
high ﬁring costs implies, on the other hand, that such shocks will have long-term aftereffects, 
and thus, countries with high ﬁring costs will need a long time to return to their precrisis level 
of employment and output.  
We draw two policy conclusions from this. First, heterogeneity in ﬁring costs within a 
monetary union may cause stress within the monetary union, as monetary policy can only 
react to the average aggregate situation, whereas, due to different ﬁring costs alone, the 
turning point in the various national recessions will be very different. Therefore, it is advisable 
within a monetary union to have ﬁring costs that are as homogenous as possible. Second, 
the larger ﬁring costs are, the more effective it may be to have countervailing automatic sta-
bilizers such as hiring vouchers. Once unemployment has started to rise, it will be very per-
sistent and, thus, take a long time to return to its old steady state level. Therefore, hiring 
vouchers may be a desirable and suitable instrument to shorten a long-lasting recession.1 
____________________ 
1  Boss et al. (2007) provide a detailed account of how hiring vouchers could be specified and im-
plemented in Germany.   Firing Costs and the Business Cycle: Policy Implications in Light of the Financial Crisis  137 
2  Empirical Evidence  
Even several years after implementation of the euro as a common currency, business cycles 
show significant performance differences across Europe. Consider the cases of Ireland and 
Spain illustrated in Figure 1. While the cyclical component of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) is highly volatile in Ireland, it is not in Spain. If the current quarter GDP of Spain is 
above its long-run trend, it is very likely to stay above this trend. The current GDP in Ireland, 
however, has a much lesser effect on future trends there.  
Figure 1: Per cent Deviation from Trend GDP 
 
One potential explanation for these differences is that the degree of employment protection 
legislation in these countries (i.e., the flexibility of their labor markets) varies. As illustrated in 
Table 1, employment protection legislation varies by a large degree between countries world-
wide, but also within the euro area. The Anglo-Saxon countries have a low degree of employ-
ment protection legislation (i.e., have flexible labor markets), while the countries in Southern 
Europe have a high degree (i.e., have inflexible labor markets). And indeed, regressing the 
volatility of output on the degree of labor market flexibility reveals a clear relationship between 
these two variables. As illustrated in Figure 2, countries with inflexible labor markets show a 
lower degree of output volatility over the business cycle. The same is true for inflation volatility.  
The macroeconomic baseline model is not able to replicate these stylized facts. There-
fore, we now proceed to extend the standard model by adding a richer and more detailed 
labor market featuring heterogeneities as well as hiring and ﬁring costs. We will show that 
such a model can explain the empirical findings much better and has important implications 






2  For a more detailed description of the model and its policy implications, see Lechthaler et al. (2008) 
and Faia et al. (2009). 138  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
Table 1: Version 2 of the EPL, Including Protection against Collective Dismissals 
 
Source: OECD.Stat, originally published in the OECD (1999 and 2004). 
Figure 2: Output Gap Volatility and Employment Protection Legislation 
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3  The Standard Model 
The standard New-Keynesian model for the analysis of monetary policy assumes that prices 
are not fully flexible, to assure that monetary policy can have real effects in the short run,3 
while assuming that labor markets are perfectly competitive and flexible. The empirical evi-
dence discussed above demonstrates, however, that this approach has two serious short-
comings: on the one hand, a relationship like the one depicted in Figure 2 could never be 
replicated because labor turnover costs play no role in such a model. On the other hand, the 
flexible structure of the model implies that an economy would jump back to its old equilibrium 
after a shock has vanished. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the reaction of the 
standard model economy to a one-period decrease in the nominal interest rate. Given the 
obvious importance of labor turnover costs, it is only natural to amend the standard model to 
address these two shortcomings.  
Figure 3: Response to a Monetary Shock in the Standard Model 
 
4  A Model with Labor Turnover Costs  
For the most part, we stick to the standard New-Keynesian model. Specifically, we also 
assume that firms produce slightly differentiated products and thus have price-setting power. 
However, we assume that changing the price from one period to the other is costly to the 
ﬁrm.4 Further, we assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in dependence 
____________________ 
3  If prices were fully flexible, an increase in the nominal interest rate would only drive up inflation one-
to-one, so that the real interest rate would remain unchanged. In such a case, monetary policy 
would only affect the level of prices and inflation, but it would not affect real variables (like real GDP 
or employment) at all. 
4  Thus, we assume the existence of Rotemberg price adjustment costs. 140  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
of the output gap and inflation (i.e., we use a standard Taylor rule to model the monetary 
authority). Thus, if the output gap increases (e.g., in a recession), the central bank will lower 
the interest rate to provide a positive impulse to the economy, while if inflation increases, it 
will increase the interest rate to fight the inflation.  
The only place where we deviate from the standard model is in modeling the labor market. 
Here we assume that firms employing workers are subject to hiring and ﬁring costs. On the 
one hand, a firm that wants to hire a new worker has to incur some costs, such as screening 
and training costs. On the other hand, a firm that wants to ﬁre a worker is subject to strict 
regulations, which can make ﬁring the worker very costly. These assumptions alone suffice 
to make an economy adjust to shocks much more sluggishly. This can be easily seen by 
looking at the dynamic equation of the stock of workers:  
  () ( ) ( ) t t t t t n n n n n η φ η η φ − − + = > − − + − = + + 1 1 1 1 1  (1) 
where  η  is the hiring rate, φ  the separation rate, and  φ − 1  the retention rate, i.e., the 
probability that a worker will keep his/her job. In a perfectly competitive labor market, the 
retention rate of employed workers would be exactly equal to the hiring rate of unemployed 
workers:  η φ = − 1 . In other words, the probability that a worker will have a job in the current 
period is independent of whether he/she had a job in the previous period. In such a case, 
flow equation 1 collapses to  η nt = +1 . It is immediately clear that employment in the current 
period does not depend on employment in the previous period. However, this is no longer 
true as soon as firms have to bear labor turnover costs. These drive a wedge between the 
retention rate and the hiring rate, as illustrated in Figure 4. The higher the labor turnover 
costs are, the larger the wedge between the two rates becomes, and, thus, the more current 
employment depends on past employment. In other words, the economy becomes more 
sluggish and persistent.  
Figure 4: The Effect of Firing and Hiring Costs 
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This is confirmed by numerical simulations of this model, calibrated to the German economy. 
The main results are illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the reaction of the model economy 
to a one-period decrease in the nominal interest rate. It can be clearly seen that the reaction 
is much more sluggish than in the standard model: the economy takes much longer to con-
verge back to its old steady state. Furthermore, we are able to replicate the empirical finding 
that economies with higher labor turnover costs face lower volatilities over the business 
cycle. This is illustrated in Table 2.  
Figure 5: Response to a Monetary Shock in a Model with LTCs 
 
Table 2: Firing Costs and Volatility 
Standard Deviations   fc=0.5  fc=0.6  fc=0.7 
Inﬂation  0.68 0.60 0.59 
Output    0.40 0.34 0.29 
5  Implications for Monetary Policy  
So far, we have only used a standard Taylor rule to describe the monetary authority. We now 
want to proceed by asking how the central bank should respond optimally to economic shocks.  
In the standard model without labor market frictions, this question is easily answered. The 
central bank does not face a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the output 
gap. By avoiding fluctuations in the inflation rate, the central bank automatically stabilizes the 
output gap. Thus, the optimal monetary policy is simple: just target inflation and try to ensure 
stable prices.  
In a model with labor turnover costs, this is no longer true, however. In fact, the central 
bank cannot stabilize both inflation and the output gap. Instead, there is a severe tradeoff 
between the two goals. If the central bank stabilizes prices it drives up the volatility of output 142  After the Crisis: New Patterns in the World Economy 
and employment. This implies that price stability is no longer optimal and that the central 
bank should allow for fluctuations in prices. It turns out that the optimal degree of inflation 
volatility depends on the magnitude of labor turnover costs. The central bank of a country 
with high turnover costs should allow for larger deviations from price stability than the central 
bank of a country with low turnover costs. This result, which is illustrated in Figure 6, has 
important implications for monetary policy in a currency union, where a common central bank 
can only set one nominal interest rate for many countries with varying degrees of labor turn-
over costs.  
Figure 6: Optimal Inflation Volatility 
 
6  Implications for Labor Market Policy  
The analysis above shows that optimal inflation volatility is an increasing function of ﬁring 
costs. However, under conventional policy rules (such as a Taylor rule), inflation volatility is 
lower in countries with higher ﬁring costs (i.e., is exactly the opposite of the situation in a 
country with an optimal rule). Thus, a monetary union imposes an implicit cost on member 
countries whenever ﬁring costs are heterogeneous. This leads to the immediate policy con-
clusion that countries within a monetary union should not have too different ﬁring costs in 
order to prevent high welfare costs.  
This policy conclusion is particularly relevant during the current crisis. Large shocks will 
lead to substantial business cycle divergences whenever ﬁring costs vary. Thus, the homo-
geneity of ﬁring costs is of particular importance for the Euro area. Additionally, flexible labor 
markets may enable firms to adapt to the challenges of globalization. Thus, policymakers 
may wish to reduce employment protection and ﬁring costs. However, this may generate 
opposition if the distributional consequences of more flexible labor markets are not explicitly 
addressed.  
This underlines the need for fundamental labor market reforms with a set of broad and 
deep policies that imply strong economic complementarities and that, at the same time,   Firing Costs and the Business Cycle: Policy Implications in Light of the Financial Crisis  143 
encompass political complementarities by taking distributional objectives into account, there-
by facilitating support for such reforms. One concept that could be used for such reforms is 
the Danish labor market policy concept of flexicurity, which combines very flexible labor 
markets, i.e., low job security, with generous unemployment support and active labor market 
policies. By balancing flexible ﬁring rules and workfare requirements with higher unemploy-
ment benefits, political support can be gained for such reforms.5  
Since institutions can be changed only gradually and with considerable lag, it would be 
useful to implement a different instrument in the shorter run while existing institutions are still 
in place. The relevant instrument is hiring vouchers. Hiring vouchers may be a very suitable 
second-best instrument to make the labor market more flexible and to trigger the synchroni-
zation of business cycles between countries. They would refund part of a firm’s labor costs 
during the first period of employment of a new hire. The amount of the voucher should 
depend positively on the length of time the new hire was unemployed and negatively on 
his/her skill level.6 Since more workers would qualify for hiring vouchers in periods of high 
unemployment, the vouchers would act as automatic stabilizers. Thus, hiring vouchers may 
not only lead to positive employment effects (see Brown et al. 2007b), but they may also 
make a rigid labor market more flexible. This may reduce the costs of a too heterogeneous 
monetary union and shorten downturns.  
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